SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED?
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S USE OF NAMECHECK TECHNOLOGIES IN NATURALIZATION
PROCEDURES
H. JIN CHO 1
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services relies
upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation to administer the
National Name Check Program, which conducts
background checks on applicants for naturalization.
Backlogs have led to long delays for aspiring citizens and
significant legal problems for the government.
This iBrief examines the First Circuit’s ruling in
Aronov v. Napolitano that an eighteen-month delay in
adjudicating a naturalization application was substantially
justified. While the government’s inefficiency can be
explained partly by an understaffed bureaucracy,
overwhelming evidence suggests that these problems are
exacerbated by a technological infrastructure that is illequipped to handle the scope of the backlog. This iBrief
argues that the government should be held liable for its
failures;
and
that
long-overdue
technological
improvements should be implemented to prevent these
issues from recurring in the future.
INTRODUCTION
In June 2009, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) announced that it had cleared the FBI National
Name Check Program (NNCP) backlog, seemingly putting an end
to a problem that had plagued USCIS in recent years. 2 The
optimism of this announcement, however, belies major concerns:
Has the government solved the problem, or merely forestalled a
¶1
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crisis? Is the government technologically competent to handle the
increased demand which could produce another such backlog? Is
it “substantially justified” in causing delays in the adjudication of
adjustment of status and naturalization applications? 3
¶2
In 2009, Acting USCIS Ombudsman Richard E. Flowers
declared that he “no longer considers FBI name checks to be a
pervasive and serious problem.” 4 After Aronov, however, it is
clear that FBI name checks continue to stymie the naturalization
process in the United States. This iBrief analyzes Aronov in light
of the USCIS’s and the FBI’s efforts to combat a serious
technological challenge, and will show that the government’s
response is not legally defensible because of its equally serious
technological shortcomings.

I. THE NAME-CHECK PROCESS
A. Technology
The NNCP reviews the FBI’s files for background
information about individuals and provides it to various
government agencies including the USCIS, which uses the
program to vet applicants for naturalization. 5 The name check
proceeds as follows:
¶3

The name is electronically checked against the FBI
Universal Indices (UNI). The searches seek all instances of
the individual’s name and close date of birth, whether a
main file name or reference. . . . [A] main file name is that
of an individual who is, himself, the subject of an FBI
investigation, whereas a reference is someone whose name
appears in an FBI investigation. . . . The names are
searched in a multitude of combinations, switching the
order of first, last, middle names, as well as combinations
with just the first and last, first and middle, and so on. It
also searches different phonetic spelling variations of the
names, [which is] especially important considering that
3
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many names in our indices have been transliterated from a
language other than English.
If there is a match with a name in a FBI record, it is
designated as a “Hit,” meaning that the system has stopped
on a possible match with the name being checked, but now
a human being must review the file or indices entry to
further refine the names “Hit” on. . . .
Approximately 85% of name checks are electronically
returned as having “No Record” within 72 hours. A “No
Record” indicates that the FBI's Central Records System
contains no identifiable information regarding to [sic] this
individual. . . . A secondary manual name search usually
identifies an additional 10% of the requests as having a “No
Record,” for a 95% overall “No Record” response rate. . . .
The remaining 5% are identified as possibly being the
subject of an FBI record. The FBI record must now be
retrieved and reviewed. . . . The information in the file is
reviewed for possible derogatory information. Less than
1% of the requests are identified with an individual with
possible derogatory information.
These requests are
forwarded to the appropriate FBI investigative division for
further analysis. 6
¶4
This system, which has its origins in the Eisenhower
administration as a means of vetting prospective federal
employees, was placed under immense strain in the aftermath of
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when new immigrationrelated security programs caused the volume of name-check
requests to grow dramatically. 7 Before September 11, the NNCP
handled approximately 2.5 million name checks annually; after the
attacks, in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, that number grew to 3.2
million and 5.6 million respectively. 8

B. The NNCP Backlog
By May 2007, the USCIS was overwhelmed, facing “a
staggering 329,160 FBI name check cases pending, with
approximately 64 percent (211,341) of those cases pending more
¶5
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than 90 days and approximately 32 percent (106,738) pending
more than one year.” 9 The agency considered a number of
solutions to this backlog, including the implementation of a
Background Check Service (BCS) which would track the status of
security checks in pending applications. 10 As USCIS Ombudsman
Prakash Khatri explained in the 2007 annual report to Congress:
USCIS has limited capability to produce reports
detailing the status of long-pending FBI name check cases.
In addition, USCIS systems do not automatically indicate
when a delayed name check is complete and the case can
be adjudicated. Often, this leads to a situation where the
validity of other checks expire before USCIS reviews the
case. 11
The 2007 report also stated the need for tools including
“wrap-around” or “wrap-back” security checks, which are “real
time security updates from the law enforcement community on
applicants who violate criminal laws.” 12 Such a system would
give the USCIS access to updated data about a person’s criminal
record without the need for additional name checks. 13 The report
noted, however, that “it appears that USCIS is focused on
providing the FBI name check program with resources, rather than
concentrating on the necessary wrap-back service.” 14

¶6

¶7
Indeed, the USCIS chose to commit additional resources to
the NNCP, allowing the FBI to increase its personnel; “[m]ost of
the improvements in name check processing times and the
reductions in the backlogs have resulted from this increase in
resources and personnel.” 15 The BCS, which was already overdue
when it was described in the 2007 report, had not been
implemented by the publication of the 2008 report, and was not
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mentioned in the 2009 report. 16 Similarly, the USCIS in 2008 was
still operating without wrap-around security checks; the
Ombudsman stated “that it does not expect this feature to be
available in the near future.” 17
II. THE DECISION IN ARONOV V. NAPOLITANO
Besides illustrating the shortcomings of employing the
FBI’s NNCP in the naturalization process, an analysis of Aronov
and its case history reveals that the USCIS was not substantially
justified in its tardiness in processing a naturalization application
pending an FBI name check. Given the predictable slowness of the
process and the aforementioned technological unpreparedness of
the USCIS, the government should not have violated the applicable
statute by imposing an unnecessary delay.
¶8

A. Facts
In May 2004, Alexandre Aronov, a Russian native and U.S.
legal permanent resident, applied for U.S. citizenship.18 In
February 2005, the USCIS interviewed Mr. Aronov without
receiving a “full criminal background check” from the FBI, despite
the agency’s own regulation that such an examination may be
undertaken only after conducting such a check. 19 Mr. Aronov was
told that he could not be naturalized until the check was complete,
even though he was entitled by statute to adjudication of his
application within 120 days of the interview. 20 In 2006, after more
than eighteen months, he filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, demanding action on his application. 21
The government settled the case and moved to remand to the
¶9
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USCIS so that the agency could grant him citizenship. The district
court granted the motion, and Mr. Aronov was naturalized later
that year. Mr. Aronov subsequently applied for attorney’s fees for
his mandamus action under Section 2412 of the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA); according to this provision, a plaintiff is
entitled to such fees unless the government was “substantially
justified” in its position.22
B. Procedural History
1. The District Court’s Decision
¶10
The district court awarded attorney’s fees to Mr. Aronov,
holding that the government’s position was not “substantially
justified” under the EAJA. 23 Substantial justification is defined as
an explanation which has a “reasonable basis in law and fact.” 24
The court noted that the government’s own internal policy
provides for expediting the FBI name check if a mandamus action
has been filed, and thus encourages such actions as a way to gain
priority. 25 It rejected the argument that the delay was justified by a
backlog in the FBI’s NNCP, explaining that the delay itself,
regardless of the agency responsible, “renders the government’s
pre-litigation position not ‘substantially justified.’” 26
¶11
The court concluded that the government’s unreasonable
delay in completing the name check forced Mr. Aronov to sue at
personal expense “to slightly mitigate the already unlawful delay
in that processing.” 27

2. The First Circuit’s Panel Decision
¶12
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed the district court. 28 The majority explained that
even when applying Chevron deference to the government’s
22
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general policy, the court is not required to find substantial
justification in the particular delay with Mr. Aronov’s
application. 29 The court’s “assessment of what is reasonable is
informed by the relevant statutes and regulations,” and the
government’s own regulation interprets the relevant statute as
imposing 120-day deadline. 30
The USCIS offered no
“particularized justification” for noncompliance, giving only
policy justifications for the FBI NNCP. 31 Finally, the court noted
that although the USCIS attributed the delay to the FBI namecheck backlog, the failure was caused by the agency’s premature
and unexplained examination of Mr. Aronov in violation of its own
regulation. 32
The dissent countered that the government was
substantially justified because the USCIS’s use of the FBI NNCP
as part of its criminal background check “was a reasonable
interpretation of a legislative command and that interpretation was
committed to the agency’s expertise.” 33 Furthermore, it argued
that the relevant statute did not mandate adjudication within 120
days of Mr. Aronov’s interview, but merely established “the timing
of suits” to encourage fast action by the USCIS. 34 The majority’s
demand for a particularized justification for the delay in Mr.
Aronov’s case was unnecessary “because the entire point of

¶13
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conducting name checks is that the government does not know
what the check will uncover.” 35
The dissent supports as
reasonable the agency’s choice to “to postpone a decision on
Aronov’s citizenship until obtaining information about whether the
name check revealed risks to national security or public safety.” 36
C. Holding
¶14
The First Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the panel
decision and dismissed Mr. Aronov’s EAJA application. 37 The
court explained that substantial justification is not necessarily
achieved by being legally correct, but merely by taking a position
that a reasonable person would think is correct. 38 Such was the
case, the court reasoned, with the USCIS’s decision to include the
NNCP as part of the required full criminal background check. 39
Although Congress did not include the NNCP in that check, the
delegation of that choice to USCIS “is entirely sensible for a
number of reasons, including the sometimes rapidly evolving law
enforcement technologies.” 40
Given that Congress did not
terminate the FBI NNCP in the face of the backlog, “but rather
provided funding to expedite the process USCIS had chosen,” the
government’s decision to employ the NNCP was reasonable given
Chevron deference. 41
¶15
Finally, the court rejected the district court’s reasoning that
the USCIS’s policy of expediting applications for those who file
mandamus actions “unreasonably forces applicants to sue.” 42 It
explained that the agency’s policy of giving preferential treatment
to litigants was merely “a rational allocation of resources,” not a
grant of a statutory right to priority in adjudicating cases. 43

35
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39
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Dissents in Aronov v. Napolitano
1. Torruella’s Dissent
¶16
Judge Torruella’s dissent decried the majority’s willingness
to accept “amorphous policy interests alleged by the government
through bombastic exaggeration and doomsday predictions”
instead of compensating Mr. Aronov for the mandamus action he
filed to obtain citizenship. 44 It argued that his modest EAJA award
did not threaten the government’s policy, but merely recovered
costs incurred in filing suit “after an excessive delay attributable to
backlog and a failure to follow protocol.” 45
2. Lipez’s Dissent
¶17
Judge Lipez, who wrote the reversed panel opinion, pointed
out that even if the USCIS were entitled to Chevron deference the
government still lacked substantial justification for its eighteenmonth delay in Mr. Aronov’s application. 46 Judge Lipez insisted
that the 120 days in the relevant statute and regulation was a
deadline, dismissing the view that such a time frame was “merely
aspirational.” 47 He argued that Congress’s adoption of the option
of bringing suit made “such a related view” impossible, and that
the government’s own regulation treated the 120-day period as a
deadline. 48
Judge Lipez further explained that Mr. Aronov’s premature
interview was not an isolated error, but rather part of the USCIS’s
“regular practice [of violating] its own regulations by examining
candidates before receiving NNCP results” and inviting lawsuits
by missing the subsequent deadline. 49 “That is an indulgent
reasonable person,” he concludes, “who would view [such]
conduct so benignly.” 50 He also wrote that the USCIS was not in a
“hopeless bind” as it claimed to be, since it could have addressed

¶18
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Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting).
Id. at 100–01.
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49
Id. at 112.
50
Id.
45

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 007

its national-security concerns and the 120-day deadline “in a
manner consistent with the applicable laws and regulations.” 51
B. Technological Solutions
As the First Circuit noted in its original panel opinion,
“[t]here is nothing in the language of 8 U.S.C. 1446(a) or the 1998
Appropriations Act that requires USCIS to include the NNCP in
the naturalization process.” 52 In fact, even though the NNCP had
already existed for decades when the relevant statutes were
enacted, Congress made no provision for it in the 1998
appropriations bill calling for a “full criminal background check”
by the FBI. 53 The USCIS had no reasonable basis for relying on
the FBI’s technology, given the certainty that it would not work
fast enough to complete the name check on Mr. Aronov within the
120-day deadline.
¶19

Although the en banc majority is correct that Congress has
delegated the task of choosing the appropriate tools for the
background check of a naturalization applicant, it overlooks the
fact that the USCIS’s rate of technological development with
regard to background checks may not live up to the original
principle behind such delegations. 54 Although the USCIS deserves
deference as to its policy choices, such deference should not
extend so far as to contradict both statute and regulation—to do so
would be clearly unreasonable and unacceptable even under
Chevron. 55
¶20

The government’s response to the NNCP backlog was
focused not on updating the FBI’s tools, but rather on providing
enough resources to secure additional staff. 56 Despite the
inherently technological nature of the problem, the government
ignored the more permanent solution of making important
technological improvements like the BCS and wrap-around
security checks, and stopped at securing more funding for
¶21
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1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2448–49.
54
See supra text accompanying note 40.
55
See supra text accompanying note 29.
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personnel. This choice reflects ominously on USCIS’s ability to
deal with large workloads in the future. The Ombudsman’s Report
in 2007 pointed to three main concerns:
(1) [M]ost USCIS adjudications processes are paperbased; (2) existing USCIS information management
systems do not provide robust data analysis tools necessary
to monitor productivity and make changes when necessary;
and (3) most USCIS information management systems are
stand-alone systems with little or no interconnectivity. 57
¶22
Moreover, the report expresses the overarching concern
that comprehensive immigration reform could overwhelm USCIS’s
information systems. 58 It is clear, therefore, that new investments
in technology are needed to solve these problems.

CONCLUSION
The USCIS is ill-equipped for future crises. The agency’s
information technology falls far short of what is necessary to
handle potential workload issues like the recently resolved NNCP
backlog. As the 2007 Ombudsman’s Report explains:
USCIS remains entrenched in a cycle of continual planning
with limited progress toward achieving its long-term
transformation goals. Until USCIS addresses this issue, the
bureau will not be in a position to manage existing
workloads or handle the potentially dramatic increase in
immigration benefits processing workloads that could result
from proposed immigration reform legislation. 59
¶23

¶24
The intervening years have seen the USCIS triumphant
over its elimination of the NNCP backlog, but largely silent on the
topic of its technological transformation. The backlog in Aronov
may be gone, but the underlying sources of the problems remain
inadequately addressed. Until the USCIS takes the steps it
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Id. at 11–12.
59
Id. at 55 (quoting An Overview of Issues and Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security: Statement before the H. Comm. on
Homeland Security (Feb. 7, 2007) (statement of Inspector General Richard L.
Skinner, Dept. of Homeland Sec.) available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/testimony/OIGtm_RLS_020707.pdf (last
visited June 3, 2007).
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considered but did not implement, 60 it will remain ill-equipped to
handle new crises and prevent lawsuits like Aronov.

60

For example, the BCS and wrap-around security checks described in 2007
USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 66.

